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INTRODUCTION
p ROFESSORS Harris and Mooney ("H & M") argue that the
new Article 9 should further advance the goals of the current
statute-to make security easier to take and to increase its scope.'
H & M defend this position against attacks from Law and Econom-
ics analysts and other scholars; both sets of critics, H & M claim,
want to increase the costs associated with secured credit or other-
wise to restrict its use. H & M's article primarily attempts to refute
the Law and Economics claims; it cites few other scholars and only
discusses the economic arguments in detail. This Commentary thus
focuses on the dispute that H & M have with Law and Economics.
H & M's support for Article 9 has both a positive and a normative
aspect. The former argues first that the debate over the efficiency
of secured debt is inconclusive as a matter of theory; the granting
of security sometimes creates net social benefits and sometimes
does not. H & M go on to claim that whether the former effect
usually occurs "is an empirical question that cannot be answered
with any certainty using existing information."'2 The law neverthe-
less should facilitate the issuance of secured debt because norma-
tive grounds exist to allocate the burden of proof in the security
interest debate to Article 9's opponents. First, security often is
indistinguishable in its economic effects from other transactions,
such as sales and the repayment of debts, that the state generally
facilitates. This creates a presumption that the state should facili-
tate the creation of security interests. Second, a debtor that issues
security is merely alienating its property. That our society encour-
ages freedom of alienation generally strengthens the normative
presumption that society should encourage the issuance of security.
* Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Professor, Yale School of Management.
Stephen Morse and George Triantis made helpful comments on prior drafts.
I Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security
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The opponents of security cannot overcome the normative pre-
sumption that security should be facilitated, given the theoretical
and empirical uncertainties that H & M expose. Hence, legislators
should act as if the desirability of security is established.
H & M do not advance the "security interest debate." Two ques-
tions have figured largely in this debate. First, how, if at all, does a
later security-financed project alter the value of earlier debt? Sec-
ond, why would a firm finance projects with secured debt rather
than unsecured debt or equity? H & M only address the first ques-
tion because they mistakenly suppose that an answer to it deter-
mines the answer to the second. As Part I of this Commentary
shows, these questions are distinct. Consequently, H & M's focus
on the first question prevents them from illuminating the issue why
security exists. Part I also shows that H & M answer the first ques-
tion incorrectly. Part II then argues that H & M's appeal to prop-
erty theory fails. That theory justifies restricting voluntary
transactions that either create externalities or are affected by
imperfect information, two market imperfections that may be asso-
ciated with secured debt. Part II next shows how these imperfec-
tions may justify giving security less favorable treatment than
current law now does. Consequently, property theory, properly
understood, does not support H & M's normative claim respecting
the manner of allocating the burden of proof in the security inter-
est debate. Parts I and II, taken together, thus exhibit the weak-
ness of H & M's defense of Article 9. Finally, the Conclusion
suggests that writing an article from the perspectives of a law
reformer and a scholar, which H & M attempt here, is harder to do
than is commonly believed, for these perspectives can conflict.
3 H & M summarize their normative claim as follows:
[T]hose who would question... the wisdom of generally respecting security interests
bear a heavy burden. They must attack directly the respect that the law generally
affords the free and effective alienability of property rights or (more plausibly)
explain why, based on distributional concerns, the law should treat security interests
differently from other transfers of property interests. No one has met that burden.




I. THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY
A. A Simple Debt Valuation Model
4
The value of a firm is the sum of the value of the claims to the
firm's cash flow: debt represents a fixed claim on the firm's income
whereas equity represents the residual claim to current and future
cash flows (dividends and growth opportunities). H & M assume
the existence of a firm that has outstanding debt. The value of such
a firm is v, = el + dl, where v is firm value, e is the value of the
equity claim, and d the value of the debt claim.5 This firm then
finances a second positive value project with secured debt. H & M
ask what effect the second project has on the earlier unsecured
debt.
To answer this question, realize that the value of a debt claim is
the sum of two present values: (1) the face amount that the debtor
promises to repay discounted by the probability that the debtor
will actually repay in full and (2) the expected amount the creditor
will recover if the debtor defaults (which is less than the first
amount). It is helpful to write down a simple expression for the
value of the initial debt claim ("dl") for H & M's firm. Let the firm
promise to repay the face value of the debt ("df") at a certain time
("t"). If the firm defaults and becomes insolvent, the creditor will
recover cxdf, where 0 <c a < 1. This says only that the creditor's
bankruptcy share will be less than the face value of the debt. A
dollar repayable at time t when the interest rate is r has present
value ("PV") of
1
PV($1) ((1 + r:) t
Let this value be t and let 7c be the probability that the debtor will
repay. Then the value of the initial debt dl, before a later project is
taken, is
d, = t[ndf + (1 - 7c)adf]
A later debt-financed project can have two opposite effects on
the value of earlier unsecured debt. First, because the number of
4 H & M do not write down a formal model but rather proceed by giving a series of
examples. This Section sets out the model from which their examples can be generated.
5 Subscripts are used to indicate that the firm will later incur more debt in the course of
doing more projects. Each element of the equation is in present value terms.
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debt claims on the firm has increased, the initial unsecured creditor
must share the firm's assets on default with more creditors. If the
second loan is financed on an unsecured basis, however, the initial
creditor can reach some of the assets the second project brought
into the firm. If the second loan is secured, the second lender can
take all of these assets (up to the value of its claim). Thus although
the issuance of later debt always reduces the value of cc (the frac-
tion of the original debt that the initial unsecured creditor will
recover in bankruptcy), the issuance of later secured debt reduces
cc the most.6 Holding all other values constant, when a falls, the
value of the initial debt d, falls as well. Hence, later debt-financed
projects may reduce the value of prior debt. This effect is greatest
when the later debt is secured.
Respecting the opposite effect, the later project's returns may
correlate highly imperfectly with returns from the firm's earlier
projects, or the later project may just be very lucrative. In either
case, taking the later project could increase the probability that the
debtor will repay the earlier loan. First, the lower the correlation
among the firm's return streams, the more diversified the firm's
project portfolio becomes, and diversification generally reduces
risk. Second, if the later project generates returns that are much in
excess of costs, these returns could be used to cushion losses on
prior projects: this effect also will reduce the default probability.
Holding all else constant in the equation for the value of dl, when
7t, the repayment probability, increases, the value of d, increases.
This is because the first value in the equation, the promised repay-
ment df, is larger than the second value in the equation, the initial
lender's bankruptcy share adf. Increasing the weight of the higher,
first value (increasing nt) while reducing the weight of the second,
lower value (decreasing (1 - nt)), necessarily increases the value of
dl. Thus a later debt-financed project could increase (or at least
not reduce) the value of earlier debt.
In sum, the effect of a debt-financed project on the value of prior
debt is ambiguous as a matter of theory. On the one hand, the
later debt reduces the value of the prior debt because it reduces
6 H & M thus say: "Our analysis acknowledges that UC [the initial creditor] and other
unsecured creditors are better off if their debtor incurs unsecured rather than secured debt
(on the assumption that the present value of each unsecured creditor's claim in insolvency
would be slightly larger in the former case)." Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 2035.
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that debt's expected bankruptcy payoff (cc falls). On the other
hand, the existence of the later debt-financed project could
increase the payoff probability for the earlier debt (7c increases). If
the latter effect dominates the former (or just cancels it), then later
debt will not reduce (and may increase) the value of prior debt.
A later debt-financed project that generates revenue in excess of
cost (in present value terms) is pareto efficient if the project does
not reduce the value of earlier debt. The new net revenue accrues
to the equity, making it better off. Also, the later lender earns a
return on the second loan (otherwise it would not have lent), and
the earlier lender's return is preserved. Thus, the later project
makes some persons better off while making no one worse off.
According to H & M, this result is relevant to the security inter-
est debate. They assume that the second project in their examples
could not be financed unless the firm gave the later lender a secur-
ity interest.7 On this view, granting security is pareto efficient
when the later project is profitable, and the repayment probability
effect of that project on prior debt dominates (or cancels) the
reduction-in-bankruptcy-share effect attributable to the granting of
security. Because the repayment effect sometimes could be the
more important, security sometimes is efficient (at least in theory).
Therefore, the issue is empirical: which of these countervailing
effects on prior debt commonly is the more important? H & M
believe that there is no convincing data relevant to this question.
They then conclude that the case against security is inconclusive on
theoretical grounds and unproven on empirical grounds, and con-
sequently turn to property theory to settle the issue.
B. Problems with H & M's Argument
H & M's argument is wrong on the facts and irrelevant to the
theoretical issue. Respecting the facts, recall that the repayment
probability effect on prior debt can dominate the reduction in
bankruptcy share effect if (1) second project returns are highly
imperfectly correlated with first project returns or (2) the second
project is very lucrative. Because firms tend to do related projects,
the first effect apparently is uncommon. Because firms tend to do
the best projects first, and because wonderful projects are rare, the
7 Id. at 2030.
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second effect also seems uncommon. Thus armchair empiricism
suggests that the reduction-in-bankruptcy-share effect usually is the
more important. 8
There is a way to choose between this view and H & M's view
regarding the facts. If later unsecured debt commonly reduced the
value of prior unsecured debt and if later secured debt reduced
that value still further, then (1) initial lenders commonly would
exact covenants from debtors prohibiting the debtors from borrow-
ing elsewhere without the earlier lender's consent and (2) initial
lenders even more commonly would prohibit debtors from later
issuing security. On the other hand, if later debt does not reduce
the value of prior debt as a rule, these contract terms should be
unusual. The facts clearly show that the predicted terms are stand-
ard: loan covenants that restrict the ability of debtors to borrow
elsewhere are very common, and negative pledge clauses, which
prohibit later secured borrowing, are almost ubiquitous. 9 There-
fore, there is no empirical uncertainty respecting the effect of later
secured debt on earlier unsecured debt: the former reduces the
value of the latter.'0
This empirical result does not end debate on the question
whether it is efficient for a firm to take a later project. To be sure,
later positive value projects that do not reduce the value of prior
debt are pareto efficient. Later positive value projects can be
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, however, even when they reduce the value
of the prior debt. This occurs when later project returns are suffi-
ciently high to overcome the reduction in value." That later debt-
financed projects may be pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficient, how-
8 These points were made previously in Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18
J. Legal Stud. 209, 231 (1989).
9 See id. at 216-18; Alan Schwartz, Contracting for Priority Positions 22 (1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). A recent
study also found that, in a sample of public debt issues rated A or higher, over 90% of
them restricted the borrower's ability to incur future liens. Mai E. Iskandar-Datta &
Douglas R. Emery, An Empirical Investigation of the Role of Indenture Provisions in
Determining Bond Ratings, 18 J. Banking & Fin. 93, 97, 99 tbl. 2 (1994).
10 Earlier analyses, such as mine, that assumed that the reduction in bankruptcy share
effect dominated the repayment probability effect thus were well grounded.
11 Leveraged buyouts commonly generated gains for target shareholders that exceeded
the losses to earlier, unprotected bondholders; thus, those buyouts were Kaldor-Hicks




ever, is irrelevant to the theoretical issues in the security interest
debate.
This is because the question whether security is efficient requires
a theory of finance to answer, not a theory of asset pricing (that
tells, inter alia, how to value a debt claim). To see what is meant, it
is helpful to return to basics. The value of a firm is the value of the
claims to the firm's cash flow. The famous Modigliani and Miller
("MM") result holds that, on the assumptions they make, a firm
cannot increase the present value of its cash flow by altering its
capital structure. As a consequence, firm value will remain the
same whether the firm finances the projects that generate its cash
flow with debt, with equity, with a combination of the two, or with
instruments more exotic than simple debt or equity. The MM
result thus predicts that capital structure is a matter of indifference
to firms. The facts contradict this prediction: firms spend consider-
able time and money creating the financial instruments that consti-
tute their capital structures.
This leads to a profound puzzle: according to MM, resources
spent to create financial instruments are a dead weight loss because
those costs cannot generate gains; a firm's value is invariant to its
capital structure. Are firms that otherwise appear to maximize
profits behaving irrationally with respect to their capital struc-
tures? The modem theory of finance responds to this question by
attempting to show how the method of financing projects can
increase the net revenue those projects generate. In the absence of
such a showing, the MM puzzle remains.
In 1981 and again in 1984, I wrote about what I called the puzzle
of secured debt.'2 My argument in brief was this: the existence of
later secured debt would commonly reduce the value of earlier
unsecured debt (reduce d, in the model above). Initial creditors
then would either bar later security (so it would not be seen) or
raise their interest rates to make up for the loss in value of their
loans. On my assumptions, the rise in interest rates would exactly
offset the decline in value of the unsecured debt, so security could
not create gains for the firm. Because it was costly to issue secur-
12 See Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 1051
(1984); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current
Theories, 10 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1981).
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ity, again no secured debt should be observed. This led to an MM-
like puzzle: If secured debt generates costs but does not increase
the revenues from the projects it finances, why is so much security
seen? I then considered whether security could reduce a firm's
financing or production costs or increase its gross revenues. Either
effect would increase firm value and thus justify incurring the costs
of issuing security. The various possibilities of how security could
reduce costs or increase revenues did not seem promising. Thus,
for me, the security interest puzzle remained. 3
H & M make no progress with this puzzle. They argue that
security is efficient when the second project in their examples could
not be pursued unless security were issued, and when the later debt
would not reduce the value of the prior debt. To see why this is not
responsive, recall that projects generate cash flows (revenues less
costs). The present value of a firm thus is the present value of the
sum of its projects. If financing any of these projects with secured
debt is costly but cannot increase project returns, then the firm
should not use secured finance at all; the costs of doing so are
wasted.
H & M assume that a creditor will only finance the later project
in their examples on a secured basis. This is initially odd because
the firm, in those examples, was able to finance its initial projects
on an unsecured basis. More deeply, creditors cannot force firms
to waste money. If investor 1 offered to lend a firm $x if the firm,
in addition to paying the market interest rate, put ten $100 bills in a
pile and burned them, investor 2 could make positive returns by
offering a deal to supply the $x without requiring a fire.
The security interest puzzle, like the MM puzzle on which it is
based, holds that when the method by which a project is financed
cannot increase the revenue from that project, the resources spent
on issuing security are wasted. Incurring these costs amounts to
13 I later came to see that a firm could increase its value by granting its initial financer
the highest priority rank if (1) potential lenders were imperfectly informed about the
quality of the projects a firm may take and (2) the firm had no nonconsensual claimants.
See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 235-41; Schwartz, supra note 9. Why some firms choose to
grant initial financers priority with loan covenants while other firms use security remains
an unanswered question. H & M assume that potential creditors are well informed about
project quality. Thus, their work is in the MM (and in my earlier) framework, where all
relevant actors are symmetrically informed.
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torching dollars. Thus the relevant theoretical question is not
whether a later secured-debt-financed project can increase firm
value (at least, in theory). Later unsecured-debt-financed projects
also can increase firm value. The question is why any project, late
or early, is financed with secured debt rather than unsecured debt,
equity, retained earnings, or something else.
H & M's method is therefore equivalent to calculating the rate at
which objects fall and then claiming one has explained why objects
fall at that rate. To do the former, one needs only a knowledge of
mathematics and eyes; to do the latter, one needs a theory of grav-
ity. Similarly, H & M attempt to calculate the effect of a later
secured loan on the value of prior debt and then claim that they
have explained why firms issue security. To do the former, one
again needs a knowledge of mathematics and the eyes to observe
that secured debt often is seen; to do the latter, one needs a theory
of finance-a theory that shows how the method of financing a
project can increase the returns that the project generates. H & M
have no such theory.
In summary, H & M have made no progress in explaining why
firms issue security or how secured finance is more efficient than
any other form of finance. Further, security does reduce the value
of earlier debt. These deficiencies vitiate the positive aspect of
their argument in favor of security. The normative aspect of that
argument is taken up next.
II. H & M's BURDEN OF PROOF ARGUMENT
A. Security and Private Property
H & M's normative argument for allocating the burden of proof
to Article 9's opponents in the security interest debate is unpersua-
sive because their reliance on property theory is too simple. As a
consequence, H & M never meet the real challenge from Law and
Economics.
Beginning with the former difficulty, H & M argue that property
theory shows the undesirability of restraining freedom of aliena-
tion. Applying this theory, they then argue that secured transac-
tions are relevantly like sales and debt repayments, both of which
the state generally encourages. This appeal to property theory is
too simple because it ignores the possibility of market failure. To
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see why this matters, recall that transactions such as sales and
repayments are considered presumptively desirable under two con-
ditions: (1) the relevant transaction affects only the parties to it;
and (2) those parties are symmetrically informed about the eco-
nomic parameters. When both of these conditions are satisfied,
voluntary transactions are highly likely to make the parties to them
better off and no one else worse off. The existence of security in
business contexts raises normative concerns precisely because
these conditions may not always be met in connection with secured
financing: such financing may harm third parties (e.g., tort claim-
ants), and the parties to secured loans may be asymmetrically
informed. When externalities or imperfect information exist, our
society commonly does and should respect voluntary transactions
less. Thus, the question whether the state should facilitate the issu-
ance of security cannot be answered without considering these pos-
sible market imperfections.' 4
H & M do not discuss externalities and asymmetric information.
Instead they proceed by analogy, arguing that security is relevantly
identical to other voluntary transactions that the law encourages. I
will give just one example (there are others) of how this analogical
method leads them astray. H & M claim that a debtor that makes a
cash sale may cause as much or more harm to its creditors as it
would if it granted one creditor a security interest. A debtor that
gives security retains all of its assets. It could use these assets,
H & M say, in such fashion as to reduce the probability of default
on other loans, or it could not. Similarly, in a cash sale, "[w]hether
the expected return to creditors will increase or decrease depends
on whether D [the debtor] makes more productive use of the cash
received or of the asset sold."' 5 Thus, both sales and security can
be helpful or harmful, depending on the particular facts. If society
14 1 previously argued that property theory implies the freedom to mortgage in
consumer contexts. See Alan Schwartz, The Enforceability of Security Interests in
Consumer Goods, 26 J.L. & Econ. 117, 152-60 (1983). Consumers do not pursue business
projects that creditors may have difficulty valuing but rather have jobs the income from
which creditors can observe. Also, consumers as a rule do not commit torts or take other
actions that could impose significant costs on third parties. When neither asymmetric
information nor externalities are present, I argued, consumers should have the freedom to
mortgage. Id. at 160-61.
15 Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 2040.
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resolves this factual issue in favor of encouraging sales, consistency
requires society also to encourage security.
To see what is wrong with this analogy, recall that the value of an
asset is the net present value of the return stream that the asset
generates. Let that value be va. If the firm sold the asset and
invested the cash in another project (or put it in the bank), it would
turn the cash into an asset the value of which, v,, is the net present
value of the return stream that the invested cash generates. The
firm would make a less "productive use of the cash"'16 than of the
asset if va>v,.
A sale in this circumstance, however, would be irrational. The
firm has no reason to sell an asset it values at $100 (v,) for $90 cash
(v,). H & M's argument thus takes this form: (1) voluntary transac-
tions are desirable because they maximize the utility of the parties
to them; (2) this occurs because parties can act rationally in their
own self-interest; (3) sales and secured transactions can have simi-
lar economic effects; (4) this similarity occurs because sellers can-
not act rationally in their own self-interest (they sometimes sell
property for less than it is worth); (5) therefore, secured transac-
tions should be given the same respect as sales. Because steps (2)
and (4) are inconsistent, the conclusion-step (5)-does not
follow.
H & M get into such deep water because security cannot be
defended by analogy. Rather, its strengths and defects must be
directly analyzed.' 7
B. Possible Inefficiencies Associated with Security
Law and Economics scholars who examine security do not ques-
tion the general wisdom of encouraging voluntary transactions.
Rather, they ask whether market imperfections that may be associ-
ated with secured transactions are sufficiently serious to justify a
regulatory response. H & M do not discuss these market imperfec-
tions and so do not contribute to the debate. This Section briefly
16 Id.
17 H & M apparently do not claim that freedom of alienation is a deontological liberty
good. That claim could not be refuted by showing that security may be inefficient; rather,
an opponent would have to show that the costs associated with security are so excessive as
to interfere with the liberty of other persons.
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discusses asymmetric information and third-party effects that may
be associated with the use of security.
1. Asymmetric Information and a Simple Signaling Model
Borrowers are sometimes said to give security to signal that they
are good risks, but signaling equilibria can be inefficient. Consider
a simple model: (1) lenders cannot directly observe the quality of
the projects that firms bring to market; (2) a higher quality project
has a lower risk of default; (3) the cost to a firm of giving security
varies inversely with the quality of its projects; (4) credit markets
are competitive.
There are three equilibria in this model. In one "pooling equilib-
rium," no firms issue security, creditors remain uninformed about
project quality, and the market interest rate is a risk-weighted aver-
age. In a second "separating equilibrium," firms with good
projects issue more security than firms with bad projects. To see
how this equilibrium could arise, assumption (2) implies that firms
with good projects would like to tell lenders the facts in order to
get lower interest rates, but assumption (1) implies that lenders will
not believe mere claims that a project is good. Assumption (3)
then implies that a firm with a good project can make credible dis-
closure: because the cost to a firm of giving security falls as its
projects improve in quality, firms with good projects can offer
security, or a lot of it, whereas firms with poor projects would find
it more costly to issue security, or as much. A separating equilib-
rium thus may exist in which firms with the best projects give the
most security and are charged the lowest rates while firms with
poorer projects give less security or none and are charged higher
rates.
A second pooling equilibrium also may exist, however. In it, all
firms issue security, so security interest signals are not illuminating.
This equilibrium occurs when the higher interest rate costs that
firms with bad projects would incur if creditors were to recognize
them as being bad would exceed the costs that such firms would
incur from issuing security. In this event, the bad firms would
defect from the separating equilibrium by sending security interest
signals-i.e., by borrowing secured.
The second pooling equilibrium is inefficient relative to the
others. In the first pooling equilibrium, creditors are uninformed,
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but firms save the costs of issuing security; in the separating equi-
librium, security costs are incurred but loans are priced more accu-
rately because creditors have more information; in the second
pooling equilibrium, however, security interest costs are incurred
while creditors remain uninformed. Thus, signaling in this equilib-
rium is "dissipative": issuing security is privately optimal for firms
(the lower interest rate exceeds the cost), but the security interest
signals are socially wasteful because they do not improve loan pric-
ing. Recent theoretical analyses show that the inefficiencies from
"dissipative signaling" can be worse than the inefficiencies associ-
ated with other forms of pooling. When that occurs, it is efficient
to restrict the ability of firms to signal. As applied here, restricting
security thus can be efficient in theory.'
This analysis does not yet justify restricting security for two rea-
sons. First, given the current state of the theory, it is difficult to
know just when dissipative rather than informative signaling
occurs. Second, signaling models sometimes predict badly, which
counsels caution.' 9 Nevertheless, the theory indicates that when
information is asymmetric, parties take actions, often in theory and
sometimes in life, that are privately optimal but socially inefficient.
As a consequence, defenses of security that fail to consider asym-
metric information are incomplete.
2. Third-Party Effects
To understand third-party effects, consider a set of tort claimants
who are not in a bargaining relationship with the firm that injures
them. If the injurer is not fully insured and if actual victims will get
little in the injurer's bankruptcy, then potential victims may take
excessive precautions to avoid harm. This inefficiency can be ame-
1 Arguments that welfare in asymmetric information environments can be improved by
restricting private contract, including the ability to send contractual signals, have been
made by Philippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts
Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. Econ. & Organization 381 (1990), and Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101
Yale L.J. 729 (1992). An interesting dissipative signaling model that deals extensively with
security is presented in Arnoud W.A. Boot, Anjan V. Thakor & Gregory F. Udell, Secured
Lending and Default Risk: Equilibrium Analysis, Policy Implications and Empirical
Results, 101 Econ. J. 458 (1991).
19 See Francine Lafontaine, Contractual Arrangements as Signalling Devices: Evidence
from Franchising, 9 J.L. Econ. & Organization 256 (1993).
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liorated by increasing the tort claimants' expected bankruptcy pay-
off. Doing that, however, would make secured credit less desirable
to take. This effect of helping tort claimants would count against
reform if secured credit uncontroversially increases welfare. Then
the decisionmaker would have to compare the "tort inefficiency" of
inducing excessive precautions to the "credit inefficiency" of reduc-
ing the desirability of secured credit. On the other hand, if the
nature and extent of the latter inefficiency are hard to identify, the
case for helping tort claimants becomes stronger by default.
20
The policy issue that third-party effects raises thus is not whether
secured credit should be burdened simpliciter. Rather, the ques-
tion that the Law and Economics scholars raise concerns the desir-
ability of the current bankruptcy priority scheme. H & M never
discuss nonconsensual bankruptcy claimants and thus have nothing
to say to this question.
CONCLUSION
H & M's defense of Article 9 is unpersuasive. These authors fail
to show why security exists or whether it commonly creates net
social gains. Moreover, H & M do not seriously consider ineffi-
ciencies, arising from externalities and asymmetric information,
that may be associated with security. Thus, they have no answer to
attacks on security that rest on the existence of these species of
market failure. The existence of possible market failure also viti-
ates H & M's attempt to allocate the burden of proof in the secur-
ity interest debate to Article 9's opponents. That attempt rests on
the alleged analogy between security contracts and other contracts
that the law encourages. These latter contracts, however, seldom
are plausibly associated with market failure.
In my view, H & M do not succeed, because they fail to take the
analysis of security seriously. The authors state as their " 'first
principle' that Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 should facili-
tate the creation of security interests."' This assumes what schol-
ars should demonstrate. Were H & M to have asked instead
whether Article 9 should facilitate the creation of security interests,
20 The relation between tort and bankruptcy law is complex. For a brief discussion, see
Schwartz, supra note 8, at 257-59.
21 Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 2021.
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they might have made serious use of the modem theories of
finance and property, and thus made fewer errors. H & M serve as
Reporters for the Drafting Committee to revise Article 9. Perhaps
the constraints associated with that role would cause any scholar to
slight fundamental questions, such as whether Article 9 itself is a
good idea. But then perhaps Reporters should not try to write
basic articles.

